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Abstract
The Vuolteenaho (2002) return decomposition is linear because it assumes
that the market’s return expectations are obtained solely from accounting infor-
mation. By restricting accounting recognition rules to specific (and primarily)
negative future cash flow shocks, conservative accounting drives a wedge between
the market’s return expectations that are based upon all positive and negative
cash flow shocks and return expectations that are based solely on accounting
numbers. This insight allow us to derive analytically a nonlinear relation be-
tween revisions to returns and earnings news for conservative firms, of which
the Basu relation is a special case. This nonlinear relation is shown to be math-
ematically equivalent to two linear relations conditioned on the firm’s degree of
conservatism. From these relations, we derive a model-based measure of the de-
gree of conservatism at the firm-year level which is a function of the determinants
of conditional conservatism. To account for the endogeneity of the firm’s degree
of conservatism and mitigate potential sample selection bias (Dietrich, Muller
and Reidl 2007), the model is implemented empirically using a switching regres-
sion approach in which the switch point, namely, the degree of conservatism, is
both unobservable and endogenously determined. Consistent estimates of the
parameters of the switching regression, including the endogenous determinants
of conservatism posited by Watts, are obtained by simultaneous maximum like-
lihood estimation. The results indicate that the degree of conservatism is a
positive function of contractual information asymmetry and litigation risk but
a negative function of taxes.
We wish to thank seminar participants at the City University of Hong Kong,
University of Texas at Dallas, the University of Toronto, Tel-Aviv Univrersity,
the Tel-Aviv 2009 Conference in Accounting for helpful comments.
1 Introduction
This study develops a model-based measure of the degree of conditional con-
servatism at the firm-year level and uses this metric to empirically test Watt’s
(2003a,b) conjecture regarding the determinants of conditional conservatism.1
More specifically, we develop a model of conditional conservatism that yields a
nonlinear relation between revisions to returns, earnings news and discount rate
news. Revisions to returns are defined as unexpected current period equity re-
turns. Earnings news is the conceptually correct measure of an earnings surprise
and is defined as the revision (shock) to the discounted sum of expected current
and future earnings over the lifetime of the firm. Discount rate news is defined
as the revision to the discounted sum of expected future returns over the life-
time of the firm. This nonlinear relation cannot be estimated by Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) without bias because of the (model-driven) form of the nonlin-
ear relation and concomitant sample selectivity concerns [Maddala (1983, 1986,
1991), Shehata (1991), Dietrich, Muller and Riedl (2006)]. To mitigate these
concerns, a switching regression methodology is employed in which the switch
point, our proxy for the degree of conditional conservatism, is both unobserv-
able and endogenously determined. We find empirically that our measure of the
degree of conservatism is a positive function of contractual information asym-
metry and litigation risk, and a negative function of taxes, partially confirming
Watt’s (2003a,b) conjecture.2
1A number of empirical studies (e.g., Qiang 2007; Khan and Watts 2007; Lara, Osma and
Penalva 2009) have tested Watt’s determinants of conditional conservatism using Basu (1997)
and Basu-like measures of conditional conservatism. However, these studies do not address
the endogeneity criticism of the Basu metric by Dietrich, Muller and Riedl (2007)—see also
Maddala (1983, 1986, 1994)—nor a number of the other criticisms of the Basu measure by
Givoly, Hayn and Natarajan (2007) and Pattaoukas and Thomas (2009).
2Callen, Segal and Hope (2009) also use the Vuolteenaho (2002) accounting framework
to intuit a nonlinear relation between earnings news and returns. However, they fail to
develop the nonlinear relation formally. More importantly, they do not develop a theory-based
measure of the degree of conservatism. They also do not estimate the degree of conservatism
endogenously.
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We also validate our measure of the degree of conservatism. The estimated
degree of conservatism is negatively associated with profitability and total accru-
als, consistent with more conservative firms reporting lower earnings and more
negative accruals. Further, more conservative firms have higher market-to-book
ratios consistent with the arguments of Roychowdhury and Watts (2007). In
addition, consistent with Givoly et al. (2007), more conservative firms have
higher variability in earnings and accruals, and are more likely to report losses.
Finally, the degree of conservatism at the firm level is fairly stable.
In what follows, Section 2 describes the model and derives the nonlinear
relation between revisions to returns, earnings news and discount rate news
for the conservative firm. Proofs are relegated to an appendix. This section
also derives the Basu (1997) relation rigorously as a special case. Section 3
discusses the econometrics of the endogenous switching regression methodology
with special emphasis on the case where the switch point, that is, the firm’s
degree of conservatism, is not observable. Section 4 provides the empirical
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Revision to Returns and the Conservative Firm
Our model is based upon the Vuolteenaho (2002) accounting return decompo-
sition framework. He shows that revisions to unexpected returns are a linear
function of accounting-based earnings news and discount rate news. The return
decomposition is linear because Vuolteenaho implicitly assumes that market ex-
pectations are conditioned solely on accounting information (earnings and book
values of equity), so that revisions to expected returns are necessarily equal to
revisions to expected earnings less revisions to expected discount rates over the
lifetime of the firm. However, this return decomposition fails to consider the
3
conservative nature of the accounting system. By restricting accounting recog-
nition rules to specific (and primarily) negative cash flow shocks, conservative
accounting drives a wedge between the market’s expectations, which are condi-
tioned upon the immediate recognition of both positive and negative future cash
flow shocks, and expectations based solely on conservative accounting numbers
for which some negative shocks and almost all positive shocks remain unrecog-
nized in earnings until realized. This wedge, as we will show formally, yields
a nonlinear relation between unexpected returns, earnings news and discount
rate news. This intuition is similar to that of Gonedes (1978) and Antle, Dem-
ski and Ryan (1994) who show that, except under very restrictive conditions,
the relationship between revisions to returns and revisions to earnings need not
be linear, or even monotone, if the accounting system uses a more restrictive
information set than does the market.
A simple styllized example illustrates the nonlinear relation between revi-
sions to returns and earnings news. Consider the stock price of a pharmaceuti-
cal company that acquired a pipeline of drugs. Subsequently, one of these drugs
receives FDA approval. The company’s equity price will adjust upwards imme-
diately to the positive news. However, given restrictive conservative accounting
revenue recognition rules, accounting earnings will adjust to this information
only at a later date when sales revenues from the new drug are realized. Al-
though earnings news is measured over the lifetime of the firm, nevertheless,
earnings news in this example is zero because earnings news is the change in
current expectations of future cash flows. Because conservative accounting does
not recognize any of the positive future cash flows currently, investor expecta-
tions about future cash flows will not change if their information set is based
solely on conservative accounting information. As a consequence, at the time of
FDA approval, the revision to market returns is positive whereas the accounting-
based earnings news is zero, resulting in zero correlation between revisions to
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returns and earnings news. Conversely, suppose that the FDA suddenly disap-
proves one of the drugs in the pipeline because of severe side eﬀects. In this
case, not only will the company’s equity price drop but conservative accounting
will likely require the company to record a loss. Hence, for negative news, there
is a positive correlation between revisions to returns and earnings news even if
investors first learn of the negative future cash flow shock from non-accounting
sources. The remainder of this section is devoted to formally deriving a nonlin-
ear relation between market returns, earnings news and discount rate news for
the conservative firm.
We model the market conceptually as reacting to all positive and negative
shocks to the firm’s future cash flows. Thus, we model the market as if it is privy
to a symmetric accounting system, which reports all shocks to earnings whether
positive and negative, and forms its return expectations based on those reports.
We follow the Vuolteenaho (2002) approach to modeling the dynamics of the
market’s expectations, and assume that the dynamics follow a log-linear station-
ary Vector Autoregressive (VAR) process.3 More specifically, we assume that
(log deflated) return and earnings dynamics can be described by the bivariate
VAR process:
 = 0 + 1−1 + 2−1 + 1 (1)
 = 0 + 1−1 + 2−1 + 2 (2)
where the superscript S denotes a symmetric accounting system,  = log(1+
  −1) = the log of (one plus) earnings deflated by prior period book value,
 = the log of (one plus) the firm’s cum dividend equity return and 1 and
3There are a number of early empirical studies that model the time series of firm-level
earnings as part of VAR processes, including Bar-Yosef, Callen, and Livnat (1987, 1996), and
Finger (1994). More recent empirical work includes Morel (1999), Callen and Segal (2004),
Callen, Hope and Segal (2005) and Callen, Livnat and Segal (2006). To the best of our
knowledge, Garman and Ohlson (1980) is the first theoretical accounting study to analyze
earnings within a VAR process.
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2 are mean-zero shocks.4 In particular,  are the (normalized) earnings
from a symmetric neutral accounting system. Since no firm has a symmetric
system, these are "as if" earnings.5 In contrast,  are actual market returns.6
While we model the market’s dynamics as if investors react to a symmetric
accounting system, in fact, accounting information is generated from a conserv-
ative accounting system. In particular, firms recognize negative shocks (perhaps
partially) prior to their realization whereas positive shocks are deferred to fu-
ture periods and recognized only when realized. In other words, the conserva-
tive firm’s accounting earnings eﬀectively right-hand truncate future cash flow
shocks. To simplify the discussion, we initially assume that the firm is "extreme"
conservative in the sense that the accounting system recognizes all negative fu-
ture cash flow shocks in current earnings, deferring positive shocks to future
periods. Subsequently, to define the degree of conservatism, we consider the
case where firms partially defer some negative shocks (as well as all positive
shocks) to future periods.
In contrast to the symmetric accounting system dynamics, the extreme con-
4The definitions of  and  ( ) are not arbitrary. They are a consequence of the
structure of the Vuolteenaho (2002) model. Note that our definitions diﬀer slightly from his.
In particular, Vuolteenaho defines  as the excess return net of the risk-free rate so that the
risk free has to be subtracted from  in his equations (3) and (4). To simplify the notation,
and without loss of generality, we define  to be gross of the risk-free rate, obviating the need
to subtract the risk-free rate from  We subtract the risk-free rate from these variables in
the empirical analysis, however.
5To simplify the notation, the "as if" data are denoted by a superscipt to indicate whether
the data are "generated" by the symmetric accounting system ( ) or by the conservative
accounting system ( ). Actual data ( ) are denoted without superscripts.
6Although the return dynamic does not appear to be a direct function of the earnings
surprise, nevertheless, returns are necessarily a function of the earnings surprise since returns
are a function of earnings news and the earnings surprise is a component of earnings news.
See equation (B19) for the formal relation.
Although it is unnecessary, one can model the return dynamic as a direct function of the
earnings surprise yielding qualitatively similar results to the analysis in the text. In particular,
one can assume that the loglinear stationary VAR dynamic is of the form:
 = 0 + 1−1 + 2−1 + 1 + 
 = 0 + 1−1 + 2−1 + 
where h is a non-negative constant (bounded above by 1) measuring the extent to which
returns are aﬀected directly by earnings surprise and  = 2 for the symmetric system and
 = −2 + +2− for the conservative system.
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servative firm’s dynamics are of the form:
 = 0 + 1−1 + 2−1 + 1 (3)
 = 0 + 1−1 + 2−1 + −2 + +2− (4)
where  = log(1 + −1) = the log of (one plus) earnings deflated by
prior period book value as obtained from the (extreme) conservative accounting
system and  = the log of (one plus) cum dividend equity return assuming
that returns are based on a conservative accounting system. In other words, 
are "as if" returns that would obtain if the market restricts itself solely to the
information provided by the (extreme) conservative accounting system, and 
is the actual book return on equity generated by the conservative accounting
system.
The essential diﬀerence between the symmetric accounting system and the
(extreme) conservative accounting system lies in the current earnings shock7
From the market’s perspective, the current earnings shock, denoted 2, is
mean-zero meaning that earnings are a function of both positive and negative
earnings shocks. By contrast, the earnings of the extreme conservative firm is
function of the earnings shock −2 + +2− where −2 takes on negative values
only but is otherwise identical to 2 and +2 takes on positive values.8 Thus, in
addition to current negative earnings shocks (−2), the earnings of the conser-
vative firm are also a function of positive earnings shocks (+2−) from period
(t-k) that were deferred to period t because of conservatism.9 In contrast to
the symmetric accounting system, the firm does not recognize current positive
7Earnings shocks arise out of future cash flow shocks. From now on we refer to future cash
flow shocks as earnings shocks.
8 In other words, −2 (+2) is a right (left)-truncated version of 2 where the truncation
point is zero.
9Of course, positive shocks not recognized in current earnings could be recognized in future
earnings over a number of periods. In order to avoid undue modeling complexity, we assume
throughout that recognition obtains in one period, namely, k periods ahead k=1,2,...
7
earnings shocks in current earnings under the conservative accounting system .
Note that unlike the mean of 2, the mean of −2 is necessarily negative, not
zero. For example, if the current earnings shock facing the market is normally
distributed, then the current earnings shock facing the extreme conservative
firm is eﬀectively half-normal. The mean of the half-normal is −(2)12 where
 is the standard deviation of 2
Given these dynamics, one can solve for earnings news () and expected
return news ()–both for a symmetric and conservative systems–as in
Vuolteenaho (2002). Earnings news is defined as the discounted revision (shock)
to earnings over the lifetime of the firm.10 Formally,
 = ∆
∞X
=0
+ (5)
where  is a discount factor, () is the expectations operator and ∆() =
() − −1() denotes the revision or shock. Clearly, earnings news can be
decomposed into the conventional earnings surprise (∆ ) plus the shock to
(discounted) expected future earnings (∆P∞=1 +). Similarly, discount
rate (or expected return) news, defined formally as:
 = ∆
∞X
=1
+ (6)
is the shock to discount rates (expected future returns) over the lifetime of the
firm.11
With this background material, we are ready to demonstrate the relation
between earnings news and (revisions to) returns. To simplify the discussion
and proofs, we initially assume that future expected returns (discount rates)
are unpredictable so that discount rate news is zero. We subsequently allow for
10Earnings news encompasses not only the current earnings surprise but also the impact
of the shock on future discounted earnings.The importance of extending earnings shocks to
future periods in "value relevance" studies has been emphasized by Gonedes (1974), Antle,
Demski and Ryan (1994) and more recently by Callen (2008).
11Note that the summation begins at 0 for earnings news and at 1 for discount rate news.
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non-zero discount rate news. The prior discussion leads to our first proposition.
All proofs can be found in Appendix B.
Proposition 1. Assume that earnings and returns follow the stationary bi-
variate log-linear VAR processes of equations (1) through (4) and that expected
returns are unpredictable ( = 0  = 0 1 2) or intertemporally constant so
that  = 0, where  denotes discount rate news of a conservative firm.
The extreme conservative firm will exhibit a nonlinear relation between earnings
news ( ) and the revision to market returns of the form:
 = 0 + 1[ −−1()] + 2 ∗ [ −−1()] (7)
where  = 1 when [−−1()] ≤ 0 and 0 otherwise, 1 = 1(1− 2) and
2 = (1− 1 − 2)(1− 2) Note in particular that 1 + 2 = 1  1
Proposition 1 indicates that the extreme conservative firm will exhibit a
nonlinear asymmetric relation between earnings news and (revisions to) returns
such that the coeﬃcient on negative return news (1 + 2 = 1) is greater than
the coeﬃcient on positive return news (1) Only in the case of negative shocks
will changes in earnings news equal changes in the revision to market returns–
[ − −1()] = 1 + 2 = 1 when D=1 However, positive shocks are
not recognized currently in the earnings of the conservative firm, although they
are recognized currently by the market. Thus, changes in earnings news will be
less than changes in revisions to market returns in the case of positive return
shocks– [ −−1()] = 1  1 when D=0.
If expected returns are potentially predictable, so that discount rate news
is not necessarily zero, then a similar relation obtains except that discount
rate news has to be incorporated linearly into the former relation.12 This is
formalized in Corollary 1.
12Also, the parameters 1 and 2 take on diﬀerent values.
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Corollary 1. Assume that returns and earnings follow the stationary bi-
variate log-linear VAR processes of equations (1) through (4). The extreme
conservative firm will exhibit a nonlinear relation between earnings news, dis-
count rate news and the revision to returns of the form:
 − = 0 + 1[ −−1()] + 2 ∗ [ −−1()] (8)
where  = 1 when [−−1()] ≤ 0 and zero otherwise, 1 = [1(2− 1)−
1(2− 1)] 2 = (1− 1− 2) and  = (1− 1)(1− 2)− 221
Note in particular that 1 + 2 = 1  1
The intuition of Corollary 1 is similar to that of Proposition 1, except that
shocks to returns come from two sources, shocks to discount rates as well as
shocks to earnings. Since we assume that the information set regarding discount
rate shocks (1) is the same for the market and the (extreme) conservative
firm, discount rate news enters the pricing relation linearly. In addition, since
increases (decreases) in discount rates reduce (increase) current returns, there
will be a negative relation between the revision to current returns and discount
rate news. Hence, the nonlinear relation between earnings news and (revisions
to) returns holds for the extreme conservative firm net of discount rate news.
2.2 Comparing Diﬀerent Levels of Conservatism
In the previous section, we defined an extreme conservative firm as one which
recognizes all negative future cash flow shocks, no matter how small, in current
earnings. While this analysis is instructive, ultimately firms are heterogenous in
their degree of conservatism. Thus, the important question to be addressed is
how does the nonlinear relation obtained above vary with the degree of the firm’s
conditional conservatism. The answer of course depends on the definition of the
"degree of conservatism." In defining the degree of conservatism, we assume that
conditional conservatism manifests in the accounts only to the extent that there
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is a negative shock to future cash flows. This assumption is reasonable given the
conservative nature of U.S. GAAP, where positive shocks are normally deferred
until realized regardless of the firm’s degree of conservatism.13Conditional on
negative shocks to future cash flows, we define the degree of conservatism as
the minimum threshold for which the firm recognizes negative shocks in cur-
rent earnings; the closer the threshold is to zero (in absolute value), the more
conservative is the firm. In other words, the degree of conservatism is the mini-
mum magnitude of negative shocks that would entail immediate recognition in
current period earnings. Formally, firm B is more conservative than firm A if
firm A recognizes earnings negative shocks of − or worse in current earnings,
whereas firm B recognizes earnings shocks of − or worse in current earnings
where 0 ≤     For example, suppose that firm A recognizes earnings
shocks of -7% and worse whereas firm B recognizes earnings shocks of -4% and
worse. Suppose that future cash flows are expected to fall by 6% (in present
value terms). Firm B, the more conservative firm, will write down earnings
by 6% in the current period whereas firm A, being less conservative, will defer
writing down earnings until future periods when the shock to earnings (future
cash flows) is realized.
In order to allow for various degrees of conservatism and, hence, partial
right-truncations (below 0) of the earnings shock, we generalize the earnings
dynamics of the extreme conservative firm as follows:
 = 0 + 1−1 + 2−1 + 1 (9)
 = 0 + 1−1 + 2−1 + 2 + (2− − 2−) (10)
where 2 denotes the right-truncated density of 2 and 2 ≤ − (  ≥
0) In addition to the current earnings shock (2), the earnings dynamic also
13The theory developed in this paper can readily be extended to account for positive shocks.
Nevertheless, since conservatism in the face of positive news is a marginal phenomenon in U.S.,
GAAP, we prefer not to further complicate the model and the empirical work.
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recognizes that portion of the period (t-k) shock (2−−2−) not recognized
in period (t-k) because of accounting conservatism and deferred to period t.
Following on this definition, Proposition 2 shows the nonlinear relation be-
tween earnings news (less discount rate news) and revisions to returns for any
degree of conservatism.
Proposition 2. Assume that returns and earnings follow the stationary
bivariate log-linear VAR processes of equations (1), (2), (9) and (10). A con-
servative accounting firm that recognizes negative earnings shocks of − or
worse ( ≥ 0) will exhibit a nonlinear relation between earnings news and (the
revision in) returns as specified by the nonlinear relation:
 − = 0 + 1[ −−1()] + 2 ∗ [ −−1()] (11)
where  = 1 if  − −1() ≤ −(1 − 1 − 2)(1 − 1 − 2) and zero
otherwise 1 = [1(2 − 1) − 1(2 − 1)], 2 = (1− 1 − 2) and
 = (1− 1)(1− 2)− 221 Note in particular that 1 + 2 = 1  1
The nonlinear relation in Proposition 2 generalizes the nonlinear relation of
Proposition 1. In proposition 1, the extreme conservative firm recognizes all
negative earnings shocks, so that in the definition of the dummy variable D,
− = 0; hence the nomenclature extreme conservative. In contrast, a firm
that is less than extreme conservative will satisfy the same nonlinear relation
except that − in the definition of the dummy variable D will be less than
zero. Therefore, the nonlinear relation between earnings news and (revision in)
returns generalizes to any degree of conservatism and only the definition of the
dummy variable changes.
Importantly, equation (11) and its concomitant dummy variable suggest a
new metric for the degree of conservatism, namely −. − is the degree of
conservatism since this parameter determines how much of the negative shock
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to future cash flows the firm is willing to recognize in current earnings. The
smaller is − the more conservative is the firm, with − = 0 for the extreme
conservative firm. Interestingly, neither of the coeﬃcients 1 and 2 of the
nonlinear relation (11) are functions of the degree of conservatism −
In the empirical section below, we will in fact estimate the unobservable
− endogenously as a function of the determinants of conditional conservatism
espoused by Watts (2003a,b).
2.3 A Comparison with the Basu Relation
The nonlinear equation that we developed for the extreme conservative firm
 = 0 + 1[ −−1()] + 2 ∗ [ −−1()] + (12)
looks similar in form to the nonlinear Basu equation:
 = 0 + 1 + 2 ∗  (13)
where  is a dummy variable that takes the value one if returns are negative
and zero otherwise. However, these are fundamentally diﬀerent equations, al-
though it is possible to derive the Basu equation from Corollary 1. Such a proof
is of interest since, despite the ubiquitous use of the Basu equation to measure
the degree of conservatism empirically (Ryan 2006), we are unaware of a formal
proof of the Basu relation.
One diﬀerence between the two equations is in fact minor but needs to be
dealt with first. Basu define news in terms of returns whereas we define news
as the revision to returns. A situation in which the firm earns a positive return
of 5% but has a cost of capital (expected return) of 15% is bad news, a revision
to returns of -10%, despite the positive return. Therefore, we shall re-interpret
the Basu equation to be:
 = 0 + 1[ −−1()] + 2 ∗ [ −−1()] (14)
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where  = 1 when [ − −1()] ≤ 0 and 0 otherwise. The other two major
diﬀerences between the Basu equation (14) and our equation (12) is as follows.
First, Basu has (normalized) earnings as his left-hand side variable whereas we
have earnings news. Second, Basu does not allow for discount rate revisions
whereas as we do. The next corollary derives the Basu equation formally from
equation (12).
Corollary 2: Assume that returns and earnings follow the stationary bi-
variate log-linear VAR processes of equations (1) through (4). An extreme
conservative firm will satisfy Basu’s equation (14) if (i) all shocks to expected
future cash flows beyond the current period are identically zero and (ii) discount
rates are intertemporally constant or non-predictable.
This corollary indicates that two (fairly stringent) suﬃcient conditions will
yield the Basu relation from underlying primitives.14 Whether these conditions
hold is of course an empirical question.
3 Empirical Estimation of Conditional Conser-
vatism
In the model considered above, the degree of conservatism is intimately related
to the parameter −. To estimate − we decompose equation (11) of Propo-
sition 2 into two equations of the form:
 − = 0 + [ −−1()] (15)
if [ −−1()] ≤ −(1− 1 − 2)(1− 1 − 2)
 − = 0 + 1[ −−1()] (16)
if [ −−1()]  −(1− 1 − 2)(1− 1 − 2)
14These conditions are suﬃcient but not necessary. Perhaps, it is possible to derive the
Basu relation with less stringent conditions but we have been unable to do so.
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From the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix B—see equations (B32) and (B33)—
these latter equations can be reformulated as:
 − = 0 + [ −−1()] if 2 ≤ − (17)
 − = 0 + 1[ −−1()] if 2  − (18)
The two regime structure of equations (17) and (18)–or (15) and (16)–
conditioned on a truncated endogenous variable, namely, unexpected returns,
implies that OLS will necessarily yield biased coeﬃcient estimates [Maddala
(1983,1986, 1991), Shehata (1991), Dietrich, Muller and Riedl (2006)]. Intu-
itively, conditioning on a endogenous variable results in sample selectivity bias
unless one accounts for sample selectivity in the estimation procedure. Instead
of OLS or a standard Heckman (1979) approach, we use the endogenous switch-
ing regression methodology discussed extensively by Maddala (1983, 1986, 1991)
where the parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood. The two regime
structure of our model lends itself to the switching regression approach. Un-
like OLS, the switching regression approach yields consistent estimators of the
parameters of equations (17) and (18) and of the switching parameter −. In
essence, the two regime structure indicates that when the shock is less (more)
than − then the relation between earnings news and revisions to returns is
described as in equation 17 (18). Since equation 17 (18) describes the relation
between earnings news and revisions to returns when conservatism is (is not)
manifested, − necessarily measures the degree of conservatism.
To the best of our knowledge, the only accounting study to use a switching
regression methodology to date is Shehata (1991), who analyzes the impact of
SFAS No. 2 on R&D expenditures. Prior to SFAS No. 2, firms could choose to
expense or capitalize R&D. Since sample firms align themselves endogenously
along these two regimes (capitalizers or expensers), an endogenous switching re-
15
gression approach that accounts for sample selectivity suggests itself naturally.
Although similar, there is one major diﬀerence between Shehata’s environment
and ours which simplifies his analysis considerably. In his case too, sample se-
lection is endogenous. However, in Shehata’s case, sample separation, namely,
which firms are the expensers and which are the capitalizers, is observable so
that an eﬃcient two-step maximum likelihood estimation procedure is feasi-
ble. In our case, since the endogenously determined degree of conservatism
− is unobservable, the switching regression is of the unknown sample sepa-
ration variety. Therefore, we estimate the switching regression parameters by
a simultaneous maximum likelihood approach described below rather than the
standard two-step maximum likelihood approach.15
We elect to model the firm’s degree of conservatism (the switch point) based
on the conjecture of Watts (2003a,b). Watts argues that firms’ demand for
conservatism is an increasing function of contractual information asymmetry,
litigation risk, and tax avoidance. Inter alia, one purpose of this study is to de-
termine empirically if in fact the degree of conservatism is an increasing function
of these latter factors.
We denote the determinants of the degree of firm conservatism by the vector
. Let  be the vector of parameters that relates the degree of conservatism
− to  Our empirical model then takes the three-equation form:
 − = 0 + [ −−1()] + 1 2 ≤ − (19)
 − = 0 + 1[ −−1()] + 2 2  − (20)
− =  +  (21)
where [1 2 ] is a mean-zero vector. Equation (19) and (20) simply repli-
15On estimating a switching regression of the unknown sample separation variety by simul-
taneous maximum likelihood, see Dickens and Grant (1985), Garcia et al. (1997) and Hu and
Schiantarelli (1998).
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cate the two model-driven regimes of equations (17) and (18) but inclusive of
mean-zero error terms. Equation (21) relates the unobservable degree of con-
servatism − to its endogenous determinants  inclusive of a mean-zero error
term
Since − is unobservable, equation (21) cannot be estimated directly. In-
stead, we substitute equation (21) into equations (19) and (20) to obtain:
 − = 0 + [ −−1()] + 1  +  ≥ 0 (22)
 − = 0 + 1[ −−1()] + 2  +   0 (23)
where  =  − 2 is a zero-mean error term
We estimate the empirical model–equations (22) and (23)–allowing the
parameters of the equations to be unconstrained. Formally,
 − = 0 + 1[ −−1()] + 1  +  ≥ 0 (24)
 − = 0 + 1[ −−1() + 2  +   0 (25)
We then test to see if 1 = 1 and if 1  1 Following Maddala (1983, 1986),
we assume that the mean-zero vector [1 2 ] is normally distributed with
variance-covariance matrix:16
⎛
⎝
11 12 1
12 22 2
1 2 1
⎞
⎠ 
Although we cannot observe the firm’s degree of conservatism and, hence, the
regime that the firm is in, we can specify and calculate the probability with
which each regime occurs:
16 Since one can only estimate  and not  and  separately, we normalize  to equal
1.
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Prob ( − = 0 + 1[ − −1()] + 1 )
= Prob ( +  ≥ 0)
= Prob ( ≥ −)
= Φ(−) (26)
Prob ( − = 0 + 1[ −−1()] + 2 )
= Prob (  +   0)
= Prob (  −)
= 1−Φ(−) (27)
where Φ is the normal distribution function. The likelihood density function ()
for each observation of  − is a weighted conditional density function of
1 and 2 with weights Prob (  −) and Prob ( ≥ −) Specifically,
 = (1 |  ≥ −) Φ(−) + (2 |   −) [1−Φ(−)]
= (1)Φ(− − (1
2
1)1
[1− (2121)]12 ) + (2)Φ(
− − (222)2
[1− (2222)]12 )
where  is is the normal density function. Maximizing Plog () yields es-
timates of the parameters 0 0 1 1 of equations (24) and (25) and  of
equation (19).
3.1 The Sample
The data for this study are obtained from annual COMPUSTAT and monthly
CRSP files for the years 1962 to 2006. Return on equity is computed as in-
come before extraordinary items (DATA18) scaled by the beginning of the pe-
riod stockholders’ equity (DATA60). Annual stock returns are computed from
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monthly CRSP data adjusted for dividends, starting nine months before and
ending three months after the fiscal year-end. The risk-free rate is the annual-
ized three month T-Bill rate.
We impose the following restrictions on the data. We remove firms in the
financial industry (SIC 6000-6999). We require non-missing values of contem-
poraneous and one lag of each of book return on equity, annual market equity
returns, and the book to market ratio (computed as book value of equity scaled
by market value of equity). We eliminate small firms with market cap of less
than $10M. We remove the top and bottom one percent of the variables that are
required for the VAR estimation–current and lagged of each of annual returns,
book return on equity and the book-to-market ratio. Imposing these restrictions
results in a sample of 101,241 (10,917) firm-years (firms). We use this sample
to estimate the VAR system and the earnings and discount rate news.
The switching regression is estimated based on firm-years for which the re-
vision to unexpected returns is negative (See Section 4.2), where the revision
to unexpected returns is the residual from the return equation in the VAR
system—see equation A2a in Appendix A. The initial sample consists of 49,611
observations. Each observation has to have non-missing standard deviation of
stock returns, leverage, eﬀective tax rate, and high litigation dummy. Standard
deviation of stock returns is computed using monthly returns in the preceding
three years. We require a minimum of 12 non-missing monthly returns. Leverage
is computed as the sum of long-term debt (DATA9), debt in current liabilities
(DATA34), preferred shares (DATA130), and notes payable (DATA206), scaled
by total assets (DATA6). The eﬀective tax rate is computed as income tax
expense over the past three years scaled by total pretax income over the same
period. Income tax expense is computed as income tax expense (DATA16) mi-
nus deferred taxes (DATA50). Income before tax is computed as pretax income
(DATA170) minus minority interest (DATA49). If the eﬀective tax rate is neg-
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ative or greater than the statutory maximum tax rate then we set it to zero or
to the maximum statutory tax rate, respectively. The high litigation dummy
takes the value of 1 if the firm belongs to an industry with a high incidence of
litigation, and zero otherwise. Following Francis et al. (1996), we classify the
following 4-digits SIC codes as high-litigation industries: 2833-2836, 3570-3577,
7370-7374, 3600-3674, and 5200-5961.
In addition to requiring non-missing values of the variables above, we miti-
gate potential outliers by eliminating the top and bottom percentile of earnings
news, discount rate news, revision to unexpected returns and standard deviation
of monthly stock returns. These restriction reduce the sample available for the
switching analysis to 46,253 (9,215) firm-years (firms).
Table 1 shows the distribution of the major variables of interest for the
full sample. Sample firms exhibit large variation in market capitalization; the
mean and median market values of equity are $1,544 million and $148 million,
respectively. The mean (median) cum dividend equity market returns is 17%
(10%). The mean and median returns on book value of equity are 11% and 12%,
respectively. The median book-to-market ratio is 0.64. The median eﬀective tax
rate is 0.34 and the median standard deviation of monthly stock returns is 11%.
4 Empirical Results
In this section, we present the empirical results. We first provide statistics of
the VAR estimation results and the news items. We then show the results of
the switching regression. Finally, we present the results of a validation analysis
of our degree of conservatism measure as derived from the estimated switching
functions.
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4.1 Estimation of Earnings News, Discount Rate News,
and Revisions to Unexpected Returns
To empirically examine the associations between earnings news, discount
rate news and unexpected returns, and to construct a measure of the de-
gree of conservatism, we need estimates of earnings news and expected return
news. The latter in turn necessitate estimates of expected future returns and
expected future earnings Following Campbell (1991), Campbell and Ammer
(1993), Vuolteenaho (2002), Callen and Segal (2004), and Callen et al. (2005,
2006), we implement the return decomposition using a parsimonious log-linear
vector autoregressive (VAR) model with state variables consisting of log stock
returns, log of one plus book return on equity (earnings scaled by initial book
value of equity), and the log book to market ratio. Appendix A describes the
estimation procedure in detail.
We estimate the VAR equations by industry using the Fama and French
(1997) industry classification. Table 2, Panel A shows the mean estimated pa-
rameters across industries and their standard errors.17 The standard errors are
computed using the Fama-Macbeth (1973) method. The significant parameter
estimates imply that returns are positively and significantly associated with past
earnings and the past book-to-market ratio. Earnings are significantly and pos-
itively associated with past returns and past earnings and negatively associated
with the past book-to-market ratio. The book-to-market ratio is positively and
significantly related to past returns, past earnings, and the past book-to-market
ratio.
To facilitate the analysis, we generate firm-year estimates of earnings news
and expected return news by estimating the firm-year variance-covariance ma-
17We necessarily estimate the VAR in mean-adjusted form in order to preempt potential
estimation complexities due to the assumed truncated error term in the earnings (roe) re-
gression arising out of conservatism. Mean adjustment transforms the error term so that it
becomes mean-zero. On this issue, see the discussion surrounding equation (B9) in Appendix
B.
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trix and assuming that within-industry observations have the same VAR coef-
ficient matrix. For example, earnings news [Equation (A6) in Appendix A] is
a function of the VAR coeﬃcient matrix [A] and the residuals from the VAR
regressions [Equations (A2a) through (A2c)]. Thus, earnings news can be esti-
mated at the firm-year level using the VAR coeﬃcient matrix and the vector of
residuals Σ = [1 2 3] where ej is the estimated residual from equation
j and i (t) is the firm (time) index.
Table 2, Panel B provides descriptive statistics of discount rate news ( ),
earnings news ( ), and revisions in returns ( − −1()). The mean and
median of  (0.012 and 0.033, respectively) are positive and significant in-
dicating that the earnings news is “good” on average. The mean and median
 are also significantly positive (0.003 and 0.005, respectively) and, similar
to the findings of Vuolteenaho (2002), Callen and Segal (2004), and Callen et al.
(2005, 2006), significantly smaller than  , indicating that earnings news is
the main driver of revisions in unexpected returns at the firm level. The mean
and median revisions in unexpected returns (0.002 and 0.009, respectively) are
also positive, consistent with the positive mean and median earnings news.
4.2 Switching Regression Estimation
We estimate the switching regression using observations with negative revision
to unexpected returns. This restriction is a consequence of our definition of
the degree of conservatism and the assumptions behind the model, in particular
the assumption that firms defer all positive shocks to future periods when the
cash flow eﬀects are realized. In addition, we define the degree of conservatism
(DCON) as the minimum threshold for which the firm recognizes negative shocks
(to future cash flows) in current earnings; the closer the threshold is to zero (in
absolute value), the more conservative is the firm.
Despite conditioning on negative news, sample selectivity, insofar as positive
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news is concerned, is not a problem. In general, sample selectivity is a problem
only to the extent one tries to generalize the estimated parameters based on a
selected non-random sample to the entire population. Indeed, if we should apply
parameters estimated from the negative news sample to the case of positive
return shocks as well, then sample selectivity is at issue.18 But, our intent is
to apply our parameter estimates to negative news situations only, obviating
sample selectivity issues in this regard.
Nevertheless, sample selectivity is an issue even as it concerns negative
news because of the (potential) endogeneity of returns and the model struc-
ture. Specifically, returns are likely to be an endogenous since returns react (at
least partially) to the information conveyed by earnings news and discount rate
news.19 Moreover, the degree of conservatism is endogenously determined as a
function of (unexpected) returns. Some firms choose to recognize more negative
shocks in current earnings and others less, conditioned on negative revisions to
returns. The switching regression methodology accounts for the endogeneity
of the switch point, that is, the degree of conservatism and the endogeneity of
returns, thus yielding consistent parameter estimates. Indeed, the switch point
methodology is natural in our context given the two regime structure of the
model; one regime in which the firm chooses to recognize the negative shock
in current earnings, because the shock is greater than or equal to the switch
point (in absolute value), and the other regime in which the firm defers the neg-
ative shock to future earnings because the shock is less than the switch point.
18 Indeed, one limitation of our study is that we cannot measure the degree of conservatism
for firm-years with positive revisions to returns.
19The endogeneity of returns with respect to earnings (as opposed to earnings news) has
recently been downplayed by Ball and Kothari (2007) in the context of Basu (1997) and more
generally by Ball and Shivakumar (2008). We are agnostic on this issue. The latter papers
are irrelevant for ours both because returns are far more likely to be a function of earnings
news than earnings and also because endogeneity of the switch point is an issue in our model
even if returns are not an endogenous function of earnings news. In the case of Basu (1997),
the switch point itself is not endogenous; the switch point is defined by positive or negative
(revisions to) returns.
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Thus, even the negative news sample is not random and OLS will yield biased
coeﬃcients.
The switching regression methodology in our analysis yields a system of
three estimated equations: (i) an equation that describes the relation between
earnings news and unexpected returns when the firm recognizes the negative
shock in current earnings, which we elect to call the conservative regime, (ii)
an equation that describes the relation between earnings news and unexpected
returns when the firm defers the negative shock to future periods, which elect to
call the deferral regime and (iii) an equation that describes the relation between
the (unobservable) degree of conservatism (i.e., the switching point) and its
endogenous determinants.
Table 3 presents the switching regression results.20 Panel A gives the descrip-
tive statistics of the variables used in the estimation for the negative news sam-
ple. The negative news sample statistics for those variables that proxy for the
determinants of conservatism are very similar to the entire news sample (Table
1) with the exception of size. The average market value of the switching sample
is 1,046 million as compared with 1,544 million for the entire sample. Panels B
and C show the parameter estimates for the three equations–conservative and
deferral regimes and the endogenous switching point equation.
Panel B shows that the coeﬃcient on unexpected returns for the conservative
regime (1.963) and the coeﬃcient on unexpected returns for the deferral regime
(0.931) are positive and significant at the 1% significance level. Although the
coeﬃcient for the conservative regime is significantly greater than 1, neverthe-
less, as predicted by the model, the coeﬃcient for the conservative regime is
significantly greater than the coeﬃcient for the deferral regime at the 1% sig-
nificance level. The intercepts are positive and significant as predicted by the
20Although the regression results are presented in the table below in reverse regression form,
switching regressions are necessarily estimated in direct form with revisions to returns as the
dependent variable.
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model, although they are significantly diﬀerent from each other. This is likely
due to the fact that the intercept terms typically pick up the eﬀects of correlated
omitted variables that could diﬀer across the equations.
The estimated endogenous and unobserved degree of conservatism is as-
sumed to be a function of proxies for the demand for conditional conservatism
as posited by Watts (2003a,b) including leverage, the standard deviation of
monthly stock returns, firm size, litigation risk, and the tax rate. Leverage is a
proxy for the agency conflict between shareholders and bondholders. The higher
the degree of leverage, the greater is the demand for conservatism by bondhold-
ers in order to constrain diversion of resources from the firm to equity holders.
The standard deviation of returns is a proxy for operational uncertainty. The
greater is the firm’s operational uncertainty, the greater is the demand for con-
servatism by shareholders primarily because managerial performance is harder
to verify and less certain. In addition, firms with greater operational uncer-
tainty are exposed to a greater litigation risk because of higher risk of share-
holder losses. Litigation risk increases the demand for conservatism because
litigation is much more likely when earnings and net assets are overstated. The
tax rate should also increase the demand for conservatism in order to minimize
tax liabilities to the extent that taxable income and book income are related.
The relation between size and the degree of conservatism is ambiguous. On
one hand, larger firms face lower operational uncertainty and, therefore, lower
demand for conservatism. On the other hand, larger firms are likely to have
more resources and, hence, are subject to greater litigation risk, which increases
the demand for conservatism. Overall, with the exception of size and consistent
with Watt’s conjecture, we expect that all other determinants will be positively
associated with the degree of conservatism.
Given our setting in which we estimate the degree of conservatism us-
ing the negative news sample and the ubiquitous unconditional conservatism of
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U.S. GAAP, we predict that the intercept on the determinants equation—which
provides an estimate of the unconditional degree of conservatism—will have a
negative sign. Since the degree of conditional conservatism is higher the closer
the switching point is to zero, we expect positive coeﬃcients on all the determi-
nants of conservatism.
Panel C presents the estimates of the determinants of the degree of con-
servatism. The intercept is negative and significant consistent with it being a
proxy for unconditional conservatism. The estimated coeﬃcients on leverage,
standard deviation of monthly stock returns, and litigation risk are significant
and positive as predicted by Watts (2003a,b). A positive and significant coef-
ficient is also obtained when operational eﬃciency is measured by the bid-ask
spread instead of the standard deviation of monthly stock returns (untabulated).
These results imply that the greater the asymmetry of information in debt con-
tracts (as proxied by leverage), the greater the asymmetry of information in
equity contracts (as proxied by the variability of the firm’s equity returns and
the bid-ask spread), and the greater the litigation risk, the more likely is the
firm to be in the high conservatism regime for a given negative shock to future
cash flows. The coeﬃcient on size is also positive and significant, indicating that
the greater litigation risk dominates the lower operational uncertainty at least
with respect to the demand for conservatism.
The coeﬃcient estimate on the tax variable, which is significantly neg-
ative, is contrary to Watts’s hypothesis. However, there are good reasons why
the parameter estimates for the tax rate does not conform. Watts argues that
firm tax minimization activities will lead to an increase in the demand for con-
servatism on its financial statements. This posited tax eﬀect is based on the
notion that income for tax purposes is closely related to net income on the firm’s
financial statements. One could argue alternatively that conservatism and tax
expense are essentially substitutes for each other to the extent that they both
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reduce net income and net asset values so that as tax expense increases, the
demand for conservatism goes down. The latter notion rather than the former
is consistent with our empirical results.
We use the estimated determinants equation to compute the degree
of conservatism, henceforth DCON, for the sample firm-years with negative
unexpected returns. In essence, DCON is the predicted value of the switching
point for bad news years.
4.3 Validation of the Degree of Conservatism Measure
Table 4 shows various statistics for DCON. Panel A presents summary statistics
of DCON, which has mean and median values of -0.251 and -0.367, respectively.
The negative sign for DCON is predicted by the model. Figure 1 shows DCON
over the sample period. The figure indicates that the degree of conservatism
has increased over time. Interestingly, the degree of conservatism appears to be
at its highest point in 2002-2004 coinciding with the major accounting scandals
and the ensuing Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Panel B presents statistics on the main
determinants of the degree of conservatism.
In order to estimate which of the determinants has the most impact on the
degree of conservatism, we standardize the parameters estimates in Table 2,
Panel C.21 These results indicate that operational uncertainty (proxied by the
standard deviation of returns) has by far the greatest impact on the degree of
conservatism followed by taxes, size, high litigation and leverage in that order.
The remaining panels of Table 4 validate the DCON measure. In panels C
and D we examine the association between DCON and profitability, size, ac-
cruals, and the market-to-book ratio. Panel C shows that DCON is negatively
correlated with the firm profitability as measured by roe and positively corre-
21Absent an explicit dependent variable in the determinants of conservatism regression, we
standardize the regression coeﬃcients using only the standard deviation of the independent
variables. Since the latter include a dummy variable for high litigation, one should interpret
these standardized coeﬃcients with caution.
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lated with the incidence of losses and the market-to-book ratio. These correla-
tions are consistent with DCON being a measure of the degree of conservatism.
Specifically, the more conditionally conservative the firm, the smaller should be
its book profitability and the larger its unconditional conservatism as measured
by the market-to-book ratio (Roychowdhury and Watts 2007). Furthermore,
the more conditionally conservative the firm, the greater the incidence of firm
losses.
Panel D further ranks DCON by deciles and shows the means of the se-
lected variables discussed above for each decile. The results indicate that the
incidence of losses and the market-to-book ratio increase monotonically with
DCON deciles. In contrast, profitability and total accruals decrease monoton-
ically with DCON deciles. The panel also shows the volatility of accruals and
ROE increase monotonically with DCON deciles, consistent with Givoly et. al
(2006), who argue that conservatism is manifested partly in greater volatility of
accruals and profitability.
Since conservatism is a policy variable, it should be fairly stable over
time. Panel E provides evidence on the stability of DCON. DCON is ranked
by terciles of high, medium and low degrees of conservatism for period t and
period t+1. The diagonal shows that DCON is fairly stable. For example, high,
medium and low DCON’s in period t have a probability of 76%, 60% and 74%,
respectively of remaining in the same tercile in period t+1.
5 Conclusion
This paper models conditional conservatism within the Vuolteenaho (2002) re-
turn decomposition framework. Conceptualizing conditional conservatism as a
truncated shock to earnings, the model generates a nonlinear relation between
earnings news and (revision in) returns. The Basu equation is derived analyti-
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cally from this nonlinear relation as a special case, albeit under rather stringent
conditions. The model is then applied empirically, in tandem with a switching
regression methodology, to estimate the endogenous and unobservable degree
of conditional conservatism at the firm-year level. We then are able to test the
Watts (2003 a,b) conjecture of the determinants of conditional conservatism in
a manner that obviates sample selectivity biases.
With one exception, we find that the degree of conservatism is a positive
function of the determinants of conservatism as posited by Watts. Specifically,
the degree of conservatism is increasing with operational uncertainty, leverage
and litigation risk. Only taxes yield contrary result, most probably because
taxes are a substitute for conditional conservatism.
We also validate the degree of conservatism metric. We find that the mea-
sure is negatively associated with profitability and total accruals, and positively
associated with the incidence of losses, the market-to-book ratio and the volatil-
ities of accruals and earnings. These findings are consistent with conservative
firms having lower earnings, more negative accruals, greater unconditional con-
servatism and greater volatilities of earnings and accruals as posited by the
literature.
6 Appendices
6.1 Appendix A: Estimation of the Vuolteenaho Model
Since the "as if" symmetric earnings and the "as if" conservative returns are
not visible, we estimate the VAR using actual returns and conservative earnings.
This is consistent with the theory if we assume that "as if" returns are a linear
stochastic function of actual market returns.22
22Formally, we assume that  = 0+1+ where the  are parameters and  is either
a mean-zero error term or a positively truncated error term or the sum of the two.
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In general, the VAR estimation is facilitated by assuming that the dynamics
of the data are well described by a (stationary) time-series model. Specifically,
define  to be a vector of firm-specific state variables that follows the vector
autoregressive process:
 = −1 +  (A1)
Consistent with Vuolteenaho (2002), Callen and Segal (2004), and Callen,
Hope, and Segal (2005), the VAR coeﬃcient matrix A is assumed to be constant
over time and over firms. The error term vectors  are vectors of shocks and
are assumed to have a variance-covariance matrix Ω and to be independent of
all variables known at t-1.
We estimate a parsimonious VAR where the state variables consist of log of
one plus equity returns (), log of one plus book return on equity (), and
the log book to market ratio ().23The VAR model can then be described as
a system of (mean-adjusted) equations:
 = 1−1 + 2−1 + 3−1 + 1 (A2a)
 = 1−1 + 2−1 + 3−1 + 2 (A2b)
 = 1−1 + 2−1 + 3−1 + 3 (A2c)
We estimate the regressions separately by industry (using the Fama and
French (1997) classifications) using weighted least squares with one pooled re-
gression per state variable.24 Each annual cross-section is weighted equally by
deflating the data for each firm-year by the number of firms in that year.25
23The book to market ratio is included in the parsimonious VAR because our model is
generated from this ratio. Vuolteenaho (2002) similarly includes the book to market ratio in
his VAR specifications. It also controls for the firm’s growth prospects.
24 Industry subscripts are suppressed in the above equations.
25Using OLS gives similar results.
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As shown by Campbell (1991), the variance decomposition of these valua-
tion models can be implemented empirically by combining the residuals from the
VAR estimation with the unexpected current return valuation equation. For-
mally, let 0 = (0  1  0), where the 1 is in the i’th position. The unexpected
change in returns is computed as:
 −−1() = 01 (A3)
Equation (A1) implies that forecasts of the state vector  can be computed
as:
+1+ = +1 (A4)
Using equation (A4), the revision in expected future returns (discount rate
news) is computed as:26
∆
∞X
=1
+
= 
∞X
=1
+ −−1
∞X
=1
+
= 01( − )−1 = 0 (A5)
Similarly, the revision in expected current and future earnings (earnings
news) is computed as:
26Following Vuolteenaho (2002), Callen and Segal (2004), and Callen, Hope and Segal
(2005), we assume that  = 0.967. The results are not sensitive to this assumption for
reasonable values of .
31
∆
∞X
=0
(+ − )
= 
∞X
=0
(+ − )−−1
∞X
=0
(+ − )
= 02( − )−1 = 02 (A6)
6.2 Appendix B: Proofs of the Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1.
Since Proposition 1 is a special case of Proposition 2, we begin with the
more general bivariate stationary VAR formulation required for the proof of
Proposition 2 and then specialize to Proposition 1.
Consider the stationary bivariate log-linear VAR system of the form:
 = 0 + 1−1 + 2−1 + 1 (B1)
 = 0 + 1−1 + 2−1 + 2 (B2)
representing the market’s information (equivalent to a neutral accounting sys-
tem) where −1(1) = −1(2) = 0 Because of stationarity, it is straight-
forward to show that
 = 1−1 + 2−1 + 1 (B3)
 = 1−1 + 2−1 + 2 (B4)
where with slight abuse of notation  and  are now mean-adjusted.
Computing earnings news (equation (5)) conditional on the markets expec-
tations as per Vuolteenaho (2002), we obtain:
 = 1 1 +
1− 1
 2 (B5)
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where  denotes earnings news for the symmetric neutral accounting system
(that is, the market) and  = (1− 1)(1− 2)− 221
Now let us consider an asymmetrical extreme conservative accounting system
that recognizes all negative shocks to earnings, whether realized or not, but
defers all positive shocks to the future when realized. To simplify the analytics,
we assume that positive shocks are always realized k periods hence.
Specifically,
 = 0 + 1−1 + 2−1 + 1 (B6)
 = 0 + 1−1 + 2−1 + −2 + +2− (B7)
This is the same stationary log-linear VAR system as before with two diﬀerences.
First, the error term in the earnings equation −2 is asymmetrical, taking on
negative values only, but otherwise is identical to 2 Second, the equation
includes the (t-k) period earnings shock +2− that was not recognized in period
(t-k) earnings because of conservatism.27
As with the neutral accounting system, we proceed to mean adjust the con-
servative system. This yields
 = 1−1 + 2−1 + 1 (B8)
 = 1−1 + 2−1 + ∗2 (B9)
where ∗2 = −2−−1(−2) and the variables  and  are once more (with
slight abuse of notation) mean-adjusted. Note that −1(+2−) is a constant
for  ≥ 1 and for expositional simplicity is assumed to have been included in
the constant term 0. Crucially, note that −1(∗2) = 0 even though ∗2 is
distributed asymmetrically (e.g., truncated normal).
27We could also add a period t mean zero error term to reflect general uncertainty and
also to account for positive and negative cash flow shocks that both occur and are realized in
period t. Since the theoretical analysis is not aﬀected by this additional error term, we do not
include it here.
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Solving for earnings news of the extreme conservative accounting system,
denoted  , yields:28
 = 1 1 +
1− 1
 
∗
2 (B10)
Comparing  with  shows that the diﬀerence in the two earnings news
measures lies in the error terms of the earnings equation.
To prove Proposition 1, we simplify the analysis by assuming that 1 = 2 =
0 so that expected return news  = 0. This the case where interest rates are
not predictable so that returns are driven by the earnings dynamic alone. We
generalize to the case of non-zero expected return news in the corollary.
Since the market recognizes both positive and negative earnings shocks, and
noting that 1 = 2 =  = 0 yields by equations (3) and (4) of Vuolteenaho
(2002) and equation (B5) above
 −−1() = 
=
1
(1− 2)1 +
1
(1− 2)2 (B11)
For the extreme conservative accounting system, we obtain instead:
 = 1(1− 2)1 +
1
(1− 2)
∗
2
=
1
(1− 2)1 +
1
(1− 2) [
−
2 −−1(−2)] (B12)
Before proceeding, note that stationarity guarantees that 1(1−2)  0 (More-
over, it is quite implausible for 1(1 − 2)  0 since that would imply that
a positive shock to earnings reduces earnings news in a symmetric neutral ac-
counting system.)
28We employ Vuolteenaho’s direct formula for earnings news which, in terms of his nomen-
clature, equals 02[−Γ]−1 The indirect formula always yields linearity by construction and
is, therefore, inappropriate for our analysis.
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Suppose that the shock is negative so that 2  0 In this case −2 = 2
and, using (B11), equation (B12) simplifies to:
 = [ −−1()]− 1(1− 2)−1(
−
2) (B13)
If instead the shock is positive so that 2  0 then −2 = 0 and equation
(B12) becomes:
 = [ −−1()]− 1
(1− 2)−1(
−
2)− 1(1− 2)2 (B14)
Noting that −−1() = 1 from equation (B3) and substituting into equa-
tion (B11) yields:
 −−1() = 2
(1− 1 − 2) (B15)
Since by stationarity (1−1−2)  0 equation (B15) allows us to re-express
equations (B13) and (B14), respectively, as:
 = 0 + [ −−1()] (B16)
when  −−1()  0 and
 = 0 + 1(1− 2) [ −−1()] (B17)
when  −−1()  0 where 0 = −−1(−2)(1− 2) a positive constant.
We can further express equation (B16) and (B17) in the nonlinear regression
form:
 = 0 + 1[ −−1()] + 2 ∗ [ −−1()] (B18)
where  = 1 if −−1() ≤ 0 and 0 otherwise. Here 1 = 1(1−2) and
2 = (1 − 1 − 2)(1 − 2)  0 Note that 1  1 by stationarity so that
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the slope for negative revision in returns (1 + 2 = 1) is greater than the slope
for positive revisions in returns 1
Proof of Corollary 1.
Proposition 1 assumed for simplicity that 1 = 2 = 0 so that  = 0
If  6= 0 then for the market (neutral accounting system) one obtains—see
Vuolteenaho—the linear relation
 −−1() =  − (B19)
where  is defined by equation (B5) and expected return news ( ) is
defined by:
 = [1(1− 2) + 
221]
 1 +
2
 2 (B20)
For the extreme conservative firm,  is defined by equation (B10) and ex-
pected return news ( ) is defined by:
 = [1(1− 2) + 
221]
 1 +
2
 
∗
2 (B21)
Comparing earnings news for the market and the extreme conservative firm—
equations (B5) and (B10)—yields:
 =  + 1− 1 (
∗
2 − 2) (B22)
Similarly, comparing expected return news for the market and the extreme
conservative firm—equations (B20) and (B21)—yields:
 =  + 2 (
∗
2 − 2) (B23)
Subtracting equation (B23) from (B22) yields:
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 − =  − + (1− 1 − 2) (
∗
2 − 2)
=  −−1() + (1− 1 − 2) (
∗
2 − 2)
=  −−1() + (1− 1 − 2) (
−
2 −−1(−2)− 2)
= 0 +  −−1() + (1− 1 − 2) (
−
2 − 2) (B24)
where the second equality follows from equation (B19) and 0 = −[(1 − 1 −
2)]−1(−2), a constant.
When 2 ≤ 0 −2 = 2 and equation (B24) becomes:
 = 0 + [ −−1()] + (B25)
When 2  0 −2 = 0 and equation (B24) becomes:
 = 0 + [ −−1()]− (1− 1 − 2) 2 +
 (B26)
It can be shown that
(1− 1 − 2)[ −−1()] = (1− 1 − 2)2 (B27)
where by stationarity (1 − 1 − 2)  0 and (1 − 1 − 2)  029 Thus,
equations (B25) and (B26) can be formulated as follows:
When [ −−1()] ≤ 0
 = 0 + [ −−1()] + (B28)
29Substituting (B5) and (B20) into equation (B19), yields:
 − −1() = 1−[1(1−2)+221] 1 + (1−1−2) 2 Noting that  −−1() = 1 from equation (B3) and substituting into the latter result yields equation
(B27).
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When [ −−1()]  0
 = 0 + [1(2 − 1)− 1(2 − 1)] [ −−1()] +
 (B29)
Equations (B28) and (B29) can be rewritten as one equation of the form:
 = 0 + 1[ −−1()] + 2 ∗ [ −−1()] + (B30)
where  = 1 when [ − −1()] ≤ 0 and zero otherwise, 0 = −[(1 − 1 −
2)](−2) 1 = [1(2 − 1)− 1(2 − 1)], 2 = (1− 1 − 2)
Note that 1+ 2 = 1 and by stationarity 1  1 Again, the impact of negative
return shocks on earnings news, namely, 1 + 2 = 1 is greater than the impact
of positive return shocks 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.
We assumed in the derivation of Propositions 1 that zero is the truncation
point for the (extreme) conservative firm. Consider instead a firm that is less
conservative in that it only recognizes negative shocks below some −  0
( ≥ 0) Let 2 takes values of 2 for values below − and zero otherwise.
We use the same approach as in the proof of Proposition 1 except that now
∗2 = 2 − −1(2) Define 0 = −[(1 − 1 − 2)]−1(2) From
equation (B24), we obtain
 − = 0 +  −−1() + (1− 1 − 2) (

2 − 2) (B31)
Thus, when 2 ≤ − 2 = 2 so that equation (B31) yields:
 = 0 + [ −−1()] + (B32)
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
In contrast, when 2  − 2 = 0 and equation (B31) becomes:
 = 0 + [ −−1()]− (1− 1 − 2) 2 +
 (B33)
Substituting [−−1()] for 2 using equation (B27) allows us to redescribe
equations (B32) and (B33) and the associated inequalities as:
 = 0 + [ −−1()] + (B34)
when  −−1() ≤ −(1− 1 − 2)(1− 1 − 2) and
 = 0 + 1 [ −−1()] +
 (B35)
when −−1() −(1−1−2)(1−1−2) Combining equations
(B34) and (B35) gives
 = 0 + 1[ −−1()] + 2 ∗ [ −−1()] + (B36)
where  = 1 if  − −1() ≤ −(1− 1 − 2)(1− 1 − 2) and 0
otherwise, 0 = −[(1−1−2)](−2) 1 = [1(2−1)−1(2−1)],
2 = (1− 1 − 2) Again, 1 + 2 = 1  1.
Proof of Proposition 3
From equation (5), we have that
 = ∆
∞X
=0
+
=  −−1() +∆
∞X
=1
+ (B37)
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Substituting equation (B37) into the equation (8) of Corollary 1, yields:
 = −1()−∆
∞X
=1
++0+1[−−1()]+2∗[−−1()]+
(B38)
where  = 1 when [ − −1()] ≤ 0 and zero otherwise. Assuming that
∆P∞=1 + = 0 and  = 0 yields the Basu relation.30
30These are only suﬃcient conditions for Basu to hold. The same result obtains if one is
willing to assume instead that ∆∞=1 +  and  are constants.
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